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Time stamping

Obtain RFC 3161 time stamps from an external time stamp authority with RFC 5816 certificate binding through a machine API with pinned trust.

Signing Server can request a time stamp for a hash on behalf of a registered requester. It acts as a client of an external time stamp authority and never issues time stamps itself. The supported protocol is RFC 3161 with the RFC 5816 update. RFC 5816 introduces ESSCertIDv2 for TSA signing-certificate binding, allowing hash functions other than SHA-1. Signing Server uses SigningCertificateV2 / ESSCertIDv2 with SHA-256.

The profile also uses SHA-256 for the message imprint of the data being time-stamped. The TSA certificate binding and the message imprint are separate checks.

The mode is selected with service set to timestamp-v1 and runs as a separate server instance with no human or signing key section.

For how timestamps are used in B-T, LT and LTA signatures, see Signature levels and dependencies.

For XAdES B-T, calculate the imprint over the canonical complete ds:SignatureValue element, including markup and namespace context, rather than raw RSA bytes or bare Base64. XAdES archival protection covers the exact original/reference octets and canonical XML components in its defined order. Use signature_value for the XAdES signature timestamp and original for its archival covered-byte concatenation. PAdES keeps its raw RSA document-signature-value coverage. The kind remains a descriptive requester label, not an attestation of format validity. Only the SHA-256 digest is sent; the API cannot establish format coverage. Follow XAdES signatures for assembly, complete-level validation and renewal.

For JAdES B-T, hash ASCII of the exact canonical unpadded base64url signature member, not raw RSA or quoted JSON, and use signature_value. JAdES archives use original and hash exact original octets, ASCII .+protected+.+signature+., then all preceding encoded etsiU strings with no separators, quotes or the new archive. Follow JAdES signatures for complete-level validation and preservation.

Download the timestamp OpenAPI, decoded request schema and protected header schema for the same existing machine-request boundary. These schema annotations describe covered-byte usage; they add no field, enum value or signing authority.

Send POST /api/timestamp/v1 over HTTPS with Content-Type: application/jose and no query string, charset parameter or content encoding. The body is one compact JWS of at most 16,384 bytes. The protected header is alg RS256, a registered kid and typ idombud-timestamp-request+jws.

The payload is at most 8,192 decoded bytes and contains exactly:

Field Meaning
version The integer 1.
request_id 20–96 identifier characters, unique per requester.
audience The registered service audience.
profile A registered timestamp profile that the requester is granted.
issued_at, expires_at UTC instants, with a lifetime of at most 60 seconds.
imprint_kind original or signature_value. This is information from the requester and is not attested by the authority.
algorithm SHA256
imprint Base64 of exactly 32 bytes.

The request cannot supply a time stamp authority URL, a policy, a nonce or a credential. The server chooses the provider, the policy and a new 160-bit nonce from the profile.

On success the server returns 200 with application/json containing the request and transaction IDs (timestamp- plus the SHA-256 of the requester and request ID), the profile and provider, the imprint, the policy, the server nonce, the generation and verification time, the declared accuracy in microseconds or null, the certificate SHA-256, the public certificate chain and the RFC 3161 token as Base64.

The server validates the token before it returns it: the exact imprint, policy and nonce, the configured signer certificate, an offline path to the pinned root, the timestamping Extended Key Usage, and a generation time within the configured tolerance. A certificate returned by the authority never establishes trust. Your system should validate the token again against the original it retained.

Status error
400 invalid_request
401 unauthenticated
403 not_authorized
408 expired_request
409 duplicate_request
413 request_too_large
415 unsupported_media_type
429 capacity_exceeded
502 invalid_timestamp or provider_rejected
503 unavailable or outcome_unknown

The request ID is consumed durably before the authority is contacted. After that, a failure can mean the authority already issued a token. The server never releases a partial or unvalidated token, never retries and never resumes. Reconcile through your business process and do not silently retry with a new ID.

Each profile has the following properties:

Name Description
profile The profile name that requests refer to.
provider An opaque provider name.
endpoint The HTTPS endpoint of the authority.
policy The exact policy OID.
certificate_sha256 The SHA-256 of the authority's signing certificate.
certificate_chain_file A PEM chain of 2–4 certificates, with the signer first and the root last. The signer needs RSA 2048–4096, digitalSignature and a critical timeStamping Extended Key Usage.
tls_ca_file One to four pinned CA certificates for the TLS connection. This is separate from the signing chain.
timeout_millis 100–30000.
clock_tolerance_millis 0–30000.
max_accuracy_micros 0–60000000.
authorization_file Optional file with one Authorization header value for the authority.

Each requester has requester, a unique kid, public_key_file and 1–16 grants naming profiles. The outbound connection allows no proxy discovery, redirects, retries or compression, and no revocation lookup. The pinned chain is the trust decision. Evaluate whether that suits your provider and legal needs.

Registrations and provider settings are read at startup. A change makes readiness fail instead of reloading. Readiness checks the local files, the validity of the authority's chain, the server's own TLS and the database, and does not contact the authority. The launcher supports the same commands as for the organization seal, including diagnostics.