Signature levels and dependencies
Understand B-B, B-T, B-LT and B-LTA, choose a level and prepare the external services and preservation controls it needs.
A signature format determines how a signature is represented: PAdES uses PDF, XAdES uses XML and JAdES uses JSON/JWS. A Baseline level determines which time and validation evidence accompanies it. Choose the format for the receiving application and the level for the validation and retention needs.
What the levels mean
Section titled “What the levels mean”Each level includes the requirements of the preceding level.
| Level | What it adds | When to choose it |
|---|---|---|
| B-B — basic signature | The signature and required signed properties, including binding to the signing certificate. A claimed signing time is not independent proof of time. | Immediate validation where the receiving process can obtain current certificate and revocation information and does not need preserved proof of signing time. |
| B-T — signature with trusted time | A trusted timestamp establishes that the signature existed by the timestamp's generation time. | When independent evidence of existence at a particular time matters, or as the foundation for long-term validation. |
| B-LT — long-term validation material | Certificate chains and the revocation information needed for validation accompany the signature. | When recipients must validate later without depending on the original issuers' online services remaining available. |
| B-LTA — archival protection | Archival timestamps protect the signature and its validation material. Renewed protection maintains a chain of evidence over time. | Long retention periods where certificates, validation evidence or cryptographic algorithms may expire or become unsuitable. |
LT does not mean that a certificate never expires. LTA requires ongoing preservation: storage, monitoring and renewal remain operational responsibilities.
Choosing a level in practice
Section titled “Choosing a level in practice”B-B: validate at receipt
Section titled “B-B: validate at receipt”Choose B-B when the recipient validates the signature immediately and the business process retains the validation result and required evidence separately. For example, an internal system can verify a signed message as it arrives. B-B establishes integrity and the certificate-bound signature; a date supplied by the signer does not independently establish when it was created.
Externally, the recipient needs accepted trust anchors, the relevant certificate chain and access to certificate-status evidence under its validation policy. No TSA is required by this level. The signing certificate can be supplied or issued through an external PKI where the selected signing binding supports that lifecycle; using SCEP, EST or REST for issuance does not itself change the Baseline level.
B-T: establish trusted existence time
Section titled “B-T: establish trusted existence time”Choose B-T when the recipient needs independent evidence that the signature already existed at a particular time, such as a signed agreement received before a deadline. A timestamp establishes existence by the TSA's stated time; it does not prove that the signer personally acted at that exact instant.
Externally, arrange a trusted TSA and its applicable policy, signing chain, status evidence and service access. Configure the expected policy and trust independently of the token. B-T does not package all evidence needed for later validation, so the retention process must still obtain that evidence while it remains available.
B-LT: retain validation evidence with the signature
Section titled “B-LT: retain validation evidence with the signature”Choose B-LT when another organization or a later process must validate without contacting the original certificate-status services. For example, a case-management system can retain a signed decision together with the certificate and revocation evidence needed to validate it.
Externally, obtain relevant signer and TSA chains and signed OCSP responses or certificate revocation lists (CRLs), including intermediate-CA evidence where required by the validation policy. Validate and incorporate them while usable. Later offline validation still needs an independently established trust policy, a compatible verifier and the exact signed content. Embedded certificates alone cannot establish trust, and LT alone does not maintain protection indefinitely as algorithms and evidence age.
B-LTA: maintain evidence throughout archival retention
Section titled “B-LTA: maintain evidence throughout archival retention”Choose B-LTA for records that need maintained validation evidence across certificate expiry and changes in cryptographic suitability, such as agreements retained for many years. Archival timestamps protect the signature and validation material; later timestamps extend that protection without asking the original signer to sign the document again.
Externally, assign a preservation owner, durable storage, monitoring, a compatible archival verifier and access to a trusted TSA for renewal. Obtain new TSA validation material as needed, retain old chains and status evidence, and validate the protected history before renewal. TSA replacement requires an explicit trust decision and preservation of the earlier TSA's evidence. Historical evidence is evaluated with its proof of existence and applicable historical validation rules; it cannot be replaced by simply requiring every old CRL or certificate to remain current forever.
There is no universal renewal interval or fixed number of retention years for any level. Set the schedule from the retention policy, evidence coverage, algorithms and provider changes. Renew before protection becomes insufficient: a new timestamp cannot repair evidence that was already lost or an integrity failure in an earlier revision.
External requirements
Section titled “External requirements”| Level | Services and material | Operational requirements |
|---|---|---|
| B-B | A signing key and certificate, an explicitly trusted validation path and a verifier supporting the selected format. Certificate-status information must be available as required by the validation policy. | Retain the exact signed document and signature. Identify the signer and validate the signature, certificate, purpose and status under the receiving system's policy. |
| B-T | B-B dependencies plus a trusted TSA, its certificate chain and applicable validation evidence. Signing Server's timestamp integration uses RFC 3161 with RFC 5816 and SHA-256 certificate binding. | Configure TSA trust, policy, access and timeouts. An unavailable or invalid timestamp must not be reported as successful B-T. |
| B-LT | B-T dependencies plus the required signer, issuer and TSA certificates and applicable OCSP responses or CRLs from their status services. Both OCSP and CRL are not universally required together. | Collect valid, relevant evidence while available; check its issuer, signature, coverage and freshness before embedding it. A PDF or token containing certificates does not establish trust by itself. |
| B-LTA | B-LT dependencies plus a TSA for initial archival protection and subsequent renewals, durable storage and a verifier supporting the archival level. | Monitor algorithm suitability and evidence validity. Renew protection before the existing evidence becomes insufficient; preserve prior signatures, timestamps, validation material and document revisions. |
OCSP/CRL services can be operated by the certificate issuer or its authorized responder. Plan their availability and permitted retrieval paths separately from the TSA. Never let document-supplied URLs automatically establish network access or trust.
Format-specific representation
Section titled “Format-specific representation”| Format | Evidence representation |
|---|---|
| PAdES | The signature is embedded in the PDF. Validation data uses the PDF Document Security Store; archival protection uses document timestamps over the relevant PDF revision. |
| XAdES | XML qualifying properties carry signature timestamps, certificate/revocation values and archival timestamps. Correct reference handling and canonicalization must be preserved during augmentation. |
| JAdES | JWS/JSON structures carry the protected signature properties and profile-defined timestamp/validation material. Augmentation must preserve the protected header and exact signing input. |
This page explains the Baseline levels. Use Signature formats for the supported Signing Server bindings, input rules and credential requirements, and PAdES signatures for the complete PDF workflow and XAdES signatures for the detached XML workflow. The PAdES, XAdES and JAdES consumers embed complete CRLs; the general level description does not imply OCSP or arbitrary ETSI properties are supported. Follow JAdES signatures for its encoded unsigned components and exact timestamp/archival coverage.
Who selects the profile?
Section titled “Who selects the profile?”The requesting support service chooses the format and signing binding in its signed request. For the standard DSS task collection, this uses SigType, AdESType and the binding's exact ProcessingRules. JAdES uses its separate root profile and local task collection, and requires explicit administrator enablement for that requester. See Signature formats for the exact combinations.
The signing request has no separate B-B, B-T, B-LT or B-LTA level field. The support service selects its required completed level, obtains the required time and validation evidence, assembles the format and verifies that the result reaches that level. These steps belong to the consumer workflow. The server does not configure a general minimum or maximum Baseline level per requester in this contract.
Timestamp requests do select a named profile. That name must match an administrator-configured timestamp profile granted to the requester. The server configuration fixes the TSA endpoint, policy, signer and trust; the request cannot override them. This timestamp profile is distinct from the signature's Baseline level. See Time stamping.
Recipient, contractual and regulatory requirements
Section titled “Recipient, contractual and regulatory requirements”The receiving organization can require a particular format, Baseline level, certificate policy, TSA policy or trust service. Agree these requirements before preparing the signature: a technically valid signature can still fall outside the recipient's accepted profile.
Baseline levels describe technical evidence. B-LTA does not by itself make a signature qualified, and B-B does not determine its legal category. Requirements for qualified certificates, signing devices, qualified timestamps or trusted-list validation come from the applicable legal, contractual and validation policy. Assess those separately; see the European Commission's eSignature FAQ.
An external certificate-issuance service is needed only when that issuance model is selected. A TSA issues timestamp evidence and is separate from the PKI that issues the document signer's certificate. Human identification and consent belong to the human-signing ceremony; the TSA request does not require the TSA to identify the human signer. Organization seals use the separately authorized organization credential.
Responsibilities and selection
Section titled “Responsibilities and selection”The requesting application keeps the original document, prepares the exact signing input, verifies the response and assembles the final signature. Signing Server controls identity, approval, one-use signing authority and protected key operations. The time stamping service returns a validated token; the consumer must place it in the selected signature format and verify the completed level.
For later offline validation, select LT. For maintained archival evidence over longer periods, select LTA and assign a renewal owner. Higher levels do not replace signer identification, consent, certificate trust or original-document integrity. They also do not change when a signing certificate must be known: the PAdES and current XAdES/JAdES bindings require its exact value before input preparation.
Standards
Section titled “Standards”The level definitions and format-specific requirements are specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 for PAdES, ETSI EN 319 132-1 for XAdES and ETSI TS 119 182-1 for JAdES. RFC 5816 updates RFC 3161's TSA certificate binding with ESSCertIDv2, allowing hash functions other than SHA-1.