External PKI and certificate issuance
Optionally provision or dynamically issue signing certificates through SCEP, EST or configurable REST with protected keys and issuer authentication.
External PKI is an optional certificate-supply capability. A deployment using supplied signing credentials can run without it. When enabled, Signing Server generates a protected key and CSR, contacts the configured issuer, validates the returned certificate and stages or activates it through the registered lifecycle.
The time stamp service uses its own RFC 3161 authority configuration. Certificate enrollment does not apply to that TSA operation.
Choose a lifecycle
Section titled “Choose a lifecycle”| Selection | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Supplied credential | Use an existing configured key and certificate. No enrollment is required. |
| Provisioned credential | Explicit operator enrollment and staging, then validated activation and a pinned descriptor selected with signing.backend="provisioned". Staging alone grants no signing authority. |
| Dynamic person signing | signing.backend="dynamic" selects protected enrollment configuration. After verified identification, create a new key and certificate for the signing transaction. Never reuse them for another transaction. |
The per-transaction manager binds the verified identity, transaction, key, CSR, profile and original deadlines. Before successful delivery it validates the known signing result, retires/disables the private credential and rechecks retained public evidence. Unknown issuance, signing or retirement outcomes withhold success. Public certificate cleanup follows its configured retention; replay/consumption tombstones are retained.
Dynamic selection covers the supported generic DSS XML/PDF/CMS flows. The selected XAdES and JAdES profiles need a preknown static leaf; customer CSC uses a supplied static directory. See Signature formats and CSC signing.
Issuer protocols
Section titled “Issuer protocols”| Protocol | Configuration and boundary |
|---|---|
| SCEP | Configure the CA/RA pins, challenge and supported native CSR/message profile. Native challenge authorization and any HTTP authentication are separate. |
| EST | Configure the supported initial enrollment profile, CA trust and Basic, mTLS or their supported combination. A registered continuation contract is needed for the supported repeat flow. |
| REST | Configure fixed HTTPS endpoints, request JSON template, typed response mapping, trust and explicit lookup/correlation behavior. |
One enrollment configuration selects exactly one protocol. The issuer address, trust, profile and credentials are administrator-controlled. Requests from a signing client cannot select them. Configure your issuer to use the protocol profile, authentication method and certificate-validation policy described here.
REST request and response templates
Section titled “REST request and response templates”The request is a JSON structure containing literals and typed substitutions. For example:
{ "csr": { "$value": "csr.pem" }, "profile": { "$value": "profile" }, "id": { "$value": "operation_id" }}The response mapping selects fields by JSON pointer and maps declared values to issued, pending or rejected. It declares HTTP status handling, leaf and chain encodings, the order ID and error categories. For example, the provider-A mapping selects /result/state, /result/certificate, /result/chain and /id.
These are bounded data mappings, not executable scripts. An issued response is validated against the exact CSR/SPKI, verified identity, certificate profile, purpose, validity, chain/trust and revocation policy before activation or use. Templates cannot add trust roots, extend signing authority or introduce a caller-selected endpoint.
- Provider A request template
- Provider A response mapping
- Provider B request template
- Provider B response mapping
- Request-template schema and response-mapping schema
Authentication toward the PKI
Section titled “Authentication toward the PKI”Outbound issuer authentication is separate from signer identification and consent. Supported profiles include Basic, API key, scoped bearer, OAuth client credentials using client-secret Basic, mTLS and the declared combinations. SCEP also has its explicit native challenge-only selection; it is not an authentication bypass for REST.
Store secrets in protected files. A TLS client-authentication key is separate from the document key, native protocol message key and other excluded roles. Never forward a person's IdP password, PIN or browser token to the issuer. Endpoint trust and certificate-validation policy are configured independently of authentication credentials.
Configure and activate
Section titled “Configure and activate”- Prepare the chosen database schemas with the migration account and verify access through the runtime account. Enrollment is a separate versioned schema family.
- Choose the supplied protocol/backend example. Replace every synthetic URL, file, certificate pin, profile, identity mapping and authentication validity period with approved values for your deployment.
- Protect the configuration, key/PIN/password references and the exclusive manager namespace. Supply the exact configuration SHA-256 in the trusted
signingselection. - For staged provisioning, use the packaged
signing-enrollmentandsigning-activationtools and the operator-reviewed activation policy. Configure the resulting protected descriptor and its SHA-256 explicitly. - For dynamic selection, configure the verified subject/profile mapping and exact Access/connection pins. It creates one credential per identified transaction and never activates a general reusable person credential.
Configuration downloads
Section titled “Configuration downloads”- Dynamic human server example
- Dynamic REST/PKCS#12 example
- Dynamic EST/PKCS#12 example
- Dynamic SCEP/PKCS#12 example
- Dynamic selection schema
- Enrollment configuration schema
- Dynamic enrollment schema
Failure and recovery
Section titled “Failure and recovery”A lost response, unknown commit or later observation of a completed operation does not grant permission to issue or sign again. Reconciliation uses only the registered read-only lookup or explicitly permitted known continuation within the original bounds. Do not delete manager locks, activation receipts, audit, consumed IDs or replay tombstones to make an operation retryable.
Dynamic human responses have a 180-second host ceiling. All original identity, issuance, consent, certificate and transaction deadlines still apply. Allow for that ceiling in the requesting system and proxy, while treating a lost response as an uncertain outcome rather than a retry instruction.